Preparing for an attack: 1939-1940
I know that reading a calendar of events is not the most exciting way to spend time. Facts tend to be dry, and in this case, a bit overwhelming. But, I think we need to step back a few years and take a look at what was happening on Oahu regarding preparations for war.
The residents and military on Oahu expected and prepared for some military action by Japan, but most military and civilians expected the attack to be on the Philippines, not Hawaii. (In fact, there are letters from Navy wives [at the Hawaii War Record Depository collection] stating that their husbands felt their families were safer in Hawaii than they would be on an east coast naval base.)
Nevertheless, the Office of Civilian Defense plans were developed, the army and navy prepared, and local volunteer social organizations prepared. I’ll begin in 1939.
In 1939, the navy held the biggest war games it had conducted to date, that was in April. In May, the first black out of Honolulu was staged—it lasted 20 minutes. In August, the FBI reopened its Honolulu office and started working with the navy and the army on threats of possible sabotage. In December, the Home Economics Division of the Department of Public Instruction presented an emergency plan to the army on how to feed the public during an emergency. The use of school cafeterias was suggested.
By 1940, the pace stepped up. In February, the Navy announced its plan to triple the capacity of the Pearl Harbor Naval Station. The army was right behind them. In March, General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, visited Hawaii and announced the expansion of army units. By April, 130 ships of the U.S. naval fleet arrived in Honolulu, and the Secretary of Navy Charles Edison, after inspecting the fleet, announced to Washington, D.C. that the “Hawaii facilities are completely reassuring.”
In May 1940, there was a territory-wide black out drill, and in June the American Red Cross began its production of surgical dressings and other items for the European war zones. That same month, the Navy established a base on Maui.
In June, General Short reiterated the need for people to start a systematic and gradual accumulation of food. He stressed that this should be “everyone’s patriotic duty” to which the University of Hawaii Experiment Station responded with a recommended list of nutritional staples for home storage.
In July, Major General Charles D. Herron, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department of Army, asked the mayor, chief of police and managers of sugar plantations to plan for civilian participation in defending Hawaii against attack.
In August, fingerprinting and registering of aliens was implemented under the Federal Alien Registration Act. The Mayor’s Food Survey Committee reported that residents of Oahu could survive 45 days should outside food sources be cut off.
In September, the Pineapple Producers’ Cooperative Association appointed an emergency food committee to work with the army about using pineapple lands for vegetable crops should outside food sources be cut off. The Army gave plantation managers secret plans for control over production, storage and distribution of food in the event of war.
In October, the S.S. Mariposa and the S.S. Monterey made a trip to Asia to evacuate Americans who wanted to return to the U.S. It was in October, too, that American men registered for Selective Service.
In November, the U.S.S. Washington arrived from the mainland with 750 members of the 251st California National Guard Coast Artillery Regiment and the first big group of defense workers for the Pearl Harbor Navy base and Midway Island. (Many of the civilians stationed at Midway would be killed or taken as prisoners of war.)
In December, the Navy moved into Kaneohe Naval Air Station. The Army Engineers contracted with Hawaii construction companies to build ammunition storage magazines, radar warning stations, railway track, fixed fortifications and radio stations. Admiral Claude C. Block, Commandant, 14th Naval District, reported to Washington on the inability of the navy to “meet hostile attack with the equipment and forces at hand.” Deficiencies of planes for long-range reconnaissance, the Army’s lack of fighter planes and anti-aircraft guns, and an incomplete antiaircraft warning system were emphasized.
